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Background and Aims Opioid substitution treatment is used inmany countries as an effective harmminimization strat-
egy. There is a need for more information about patient safety incidents and the resulting harm relating to this treatment.
We aimed to characterize patient safety incidents involving opioid substitution treatment with methadone or
buprenorphine in community-based care by: (i) identifying the sources and nature of harm and (ii) describing and
interpreting themes to identify priorities to focus future improvement work.Design Mixed-methods study examining pa-
tient safety incident reports involving opioid substitution treatment with either methadone or buprenorphine in
community-based care. Setting Data submitted between 2005 and 2015 from the National Reporting and Learning
System (NRLS), a national repository of patient safety incident reports from across England and Wales. Participants A
total of 2284 reports were identified involving patients receiving community-based opioid substitution treatment.
Measurements Incident type, contributory factors, incident outcome and severity of harm. Analysis involved data
coding, processing and iterative generation of data summaries using descriptive statistical and thematic analysis.
Findings Most risks of harm from opioid substitution treatment came from failure in one of four processes of care
delivery: prescribing opioid substitution (n = 151); supervised dispensing (n = 248); non-supervised dispensing (n = 318);
and monitoring and communication (n = 1544). Most incidents resulting in harm involved supervised or non-supervised
dispensing (n = 91 of 127, 72%). Staff- (e.g. slips during task execution, not following protocols) and organization-related
(e.g. poor working conditions or poor continuity of care between services) contributory factors were identified for more
than half of incidents. Conclusions Risks of harm in delivering opioid substitute treatment in England andWales appear
to arise out of failures in four processes: prescribing opioid substitution, supervised dispensing, non-supervised dispensing
and monitoring and communication.
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INTRODUCTION
Opioid substitution therapy is now used in many parts
of the world and is an effective harm minimization
strategy to treat opioid dependence. It reduces illicit drug
use and the mortality associated with it [1–4]. With
increasing demand for substitution therapies [5–7], it is
important to evaluate the safety performance of these
programmes [8].
The United Kingdom has community-based provision
for opioid dependence [9–11]. There is a paucity of knowl-
edge and understanding about the nature of patient safety
incidents and related harm in those treatment
programmes. With anticipated greatly increased numbers
of people requiring these services in primary care settings
around the world, patient safety will become a major con-
cern [12]. The World Health Organization (WHO) have
called on policymakers, health-system leaders and a range
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of other stakeholders, including researchers, to design spe-
cific evidence-based programmes of action for improving
the safety of medication practices and systems globally
[13,14].
Our study explores the nature of patient safety incidents
involving opioid substitution treatment with methadone or
buprenorphine in community-based care settings. Our
objectives were to:
1 Classify and quantify types of methadone- or
buprenorphine-related patient safety incidents, and
their underlying causes through application of coding
frameworks to describe what happened, reported rea-
sons why the incident occurred, harm outcomes and
their severity.
2 Describe and interpret themes in reports and use this
qualitative analysis to identify priorities to focus future
improvement work.
3 Construct a driver diagram summarizing empirically
identified ideas for systems improvement derived from
objectives 1 and 2.
METHODS
Design
We undertook a mixed-methods study of people receiving
either methadone or buprenorphine in community-based
care programmes throughout England and Wales and
whose treatment had been subject of a patient safety inci-
dent report. A patient safety incident is defined as: ‘any un-
intended or unexpected incidents that could have, or did,
lead to harm for one ormore patients receiving health care’
[15]. Such reports offer a lens to understand what hap-
pened and explore common patterns of reported reasons
why the incident might have occurred [16]. To understand
similarities and differences between incidents, we used de-
tailed data coding and exploratory data analysis to identify
the most frequent sources of incidents, coupled with a the-
matic analysis to identify themes about why such incidents
occur and how they could be avoided in future care [17].
Study population
We extracted data about patient safety incidents involving
people receiving either methadone or buprenorphine from
a national database of patient safety incident reports main-
tained by the National Health Service (NHS) in England
and Wales; namely, the National Reporting and Learning
System (NRLS). This is the largest repository of its kind
world-wide, receiving more than 2 million patient safety
incident reports every year [16]. When an incident occurs
in England and Wales health-care staff are encouraged to
complete a report about the incident, whether or not it re-
sulted in patient harm [15]. Reports are anonymized and
submitted by each organization to the national database,
where it undergoes further cleansing to ensure that all
patient-identifiable information is removed.
A total of 272884 patient safety incidents were
reported by non-hospital community-based care settings
(primary care, community pharmacies and other
non-specialist services) between 1 January 2005 and 31
December 2015, which was the most recent available data
set at the time of undertaking the analysis.
The study population comprised all patient safety inci-
dent reports in which methadone or buprenorphine had
been used, as both of these have a strong evidence base
for use as opioid substitution treatment and their use is
recommended in England and Wales [2]. In the United
Kingdom, drug users can receive opioid substitution treat-
ment from community-based teams responsible for the
induction and maintenance of prescribing [8]. A range of
different models of drug treatment in primary care exist.
A common approach is that a prescriber (e.g. general prac-
titioner, nurse) with expertise in opioid substitution will
provide a patient with a prescription that is dispensed at
a pharmacy. Supervised dispensing is best practice for
new patients prescribed methadone or buprenorphine.
This requires patients to take daily doses under the eye of
a professional and allows monitoring of compliance,
progress and ongoing risk assessment [8].
Of the 3297 reports identified from free-text searches of
the database for methadone or buprenorphine among all
incident report categories (see Table 1), we manually
reviewed all completed fields for each report and excluded
reports that did not fit this category (see reasons for exclu-
sion in Fig. 1). The resulting study population comprised
2284 patient safety incident reports.
Measures
Each patient safety incident report requires the reporter to
complete a form with structured categories about location,
incident type, medication involved (if any) and the re-
porter’s perception of severity of harm, along with
free-text fields to describe what happened (IN07), why they
think it happened (potential contributory factors: IN06)
and how they think it could have been preventable (actions
to prevent recurrence: IN10), the latter two of which are
not mandatory for reporters to complete (Table 1).
Data processing
Patient safety incident reports were analysed using a
classification system aligned with the WHO International
Classification for Patient Safety (ICPS) [18] and validated
by a previous study of patient safety in primary care [17].
This includes four coding frameworks, each designed to
capture a different aspect of the patient safety incident:
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(a) incident framework to characterize the events leading
up to the outcome (e.g. wrong dose of methadone
prescribed);
(b) contributory factors framework to identify the human
and systemic factors reported to underlie the incident
(e.g. an inexperienced or locum pharmacist dispensing
the drug);
(c) incident outcome framework (e.g. hospital admission);
and
(d) severity of harm framework to characterize the level of
harm of the outcome (defined as no harm, low,
moderate or severe harm or death) classified in accor-
dance with WHO definitions [18].
The coding frameworks were developed iteratively for use
with methadone- and buprenorphine-related incidents
using a constant comparative approach [19,20]. The
analysis involved each patient safety incident report being
assessed by two of the authors, who are clinicians trained
in root cause analysis and human factors science (R.G., N.
M.) to read the complete incident report, including the
free text available in contributing factors (IN06), free text
description of the incident (IN07) and actions to prevent
Table 1 Data variables in the NRLS (example report).
Category Code name Description Example
RP01 Unique ID Numerical 1 456 789
RP02 Care setting Structured Community pharmacy
RP05 Local reference ID Numerical 3567
RP07 Trust organization code Numerical 0344
PD01 Patient age Numerical 84
PD05 Speciality Structured Primary care/community
PD09 Clinical outcome Structured No harm
MD05 Approved drug name Unstructured Methadone
IN01 Date of incident Date 15/04/2013
IN05 Incident category Structured Medication
IN06 Contributing factors Unstructured Lack of standard operating procedure for checking of
prescriptions; patient factors (being late); staff work-load
that day was high with back-to-back appointments
IN07 Free-text description of incident Unstructured Client presented 1 hour late to appointment and was
seen by keyworker only. Doctor agreed to sign prescription
for methadone. However, wrong dose prescribed
(20 instead of 40 ml)
IN10 Re-occurrence prevention Unstructured Discussion around why incident took place, and
agreement that staff should double-check prescriptions
before asking doctor to sign. Agreement to develop standard
operating procedure for double-checking of prescriptions
NRLS = National Reporting and Learning System.
Figure 1 Flow diagram of included and excluded incident reports
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recurrence (IN10) (Table 1), and then select codes from
the aforementioned frameworks which represent explicit
statements made by reporters. No implicit judgements
concerning what the reporter meant are made during
coding. Each clinician was allocated approximately 50%
of the total sample to code; further, to ensure the
validity of coding throughout the process, each coder
double-coded a random 20% sample of the other’s re-
ports. We calculated inter-rater reliability using Cohen’s
kappa (κ) coefficient. Cohen’s κ coefficient of inter-rater
(coding) reliability was high for incident type (κ = 0.70)
and moderate–high for severity of harm (κ = 0.69).
Discrepancies were discussed at regular team coding
meetings and resolved through discussion between four
of the authors (R.G., N.M., H.W. and A.C.S.). Where an
existing code was not available to represent the reported
narrative, a new code was developed and added to the
framework.
Data analysis
We used an exploratory data analysis approach and pro-
duced quantitative data summaries of the most frequently
reported incidents that were tabulated against severity of
harm and contributory factors to identify categories for
further exploratory analysis. Collections of inter-related
codes were integrated into themes (R.G. and N.M.), and
through wider team discussion we identified categories
related to processes of care (R.G., N.M., A.C.S., H.W.). This
iterative method and the evolving codes/themes/catego-
ries followed established qualitative research principles
[19,20].
We have contextualized our findings through targeted
literature searches and identified examples of existing
interventions, initiatives or national guidelines in the
highlighted priority areas. The mixed-methods analysis
was integrated and synthesized in a driver diagram, an
established quality improvement tool, to map potential
exemplar interventions to priority areas for change [21].
Institutional Review Board approval
Aneurin Bevan University Health Board Research Risk
Review Committee judged the study as using anonymized
data for service improvement purposes, and approved it
on this basis (ABHB R&D Ref number: SA410/13). A pro-
tocol for this study was not pre-registered on a publicly
available platform, and as such our findings should be con-
sidered, as intended, to be exploratory in nature.
RESULTS
In our study of 2284 patient safety incidents involving
opioid substitution (Fig. 1), methadone was the most
commonly reported drug (n = 1862 of 2284, 82%),
followed by buprenorphine (n = 394, 17%), then
buprenorphine and naloxone used in combination
(n = 28, 1%) (Table 2).
We identified four processes of care that were involved
in most patient safety incidents involving methadone or
buprenorphine; in order of decreasing frequency:
non-supervised (n=1544) and then supervised dispensing
(i.e. daily supervision of new patients taking their pre-
scribed methadone or buprenorphine to monitor compli-
ance [8]) (n = 318), monitoring and communication
(n = 248) and prescribing opioid substitution treatment
(n = 151) (Table 3).
Incidents involving prescribing opioid substitution
had the highest proportion associated with harm
(n = 14 of 151, 9%), followed by monitoring and
communication-related incidents (n = 22 of 284, 8%)
and failures with supervised dispensing (24 of 318, 8%)
(Table 3). Non-supervised dispensing had the lowest pro-
portion resulting in harm (57 of 1544, 4%). Overall, 94%
(n = 2155 of 2284) of incidents resulted in no harm, while
6% (n= 129 of 2284) caused harm to the patient (109 low
harm, 20moderate harm). There were no incidents identi-
fied resulting in severe harm or death.
Contributory factors could be identified in 75% of
incidents (n = 1721 of 2284), with 40% of incidents
(n = 922 of 2284) involving more than one identified
contributory factor. The most frequently identified contrib-
utory factors were staff factors (n = 1458 of 2284, 64%)—
for example, incidents due to attentional slips of action
(such as being distracted or misread a concentration of
medication) leading to dispensing the wrong dose of medi-
cation, followed by organizational factors (n = 1010 of
2284, 44%), such as poor working conditions with staff
busy or overloaded by work leading to patient safety
incidents during supervised consumption of methadone
(Table 4). Other identified contributory factors included pa-
tient factors (n = 205 of 2284, 9%), medication storage
and packaging (n = 133 of 2284, 6%) and equipment-
related, e.g. information technology-related (n = 47 of
2284, 2%).
Table 2 Medication types by severity of harm.
Medication
Harm severity, N/n (%)
Total NNo harm Low Moderate
Methadone 1753 (94) 93 (5) 16 (1) 1862
Buprenorphine 377 (96) 14 (4) 3 (< 1) 394
Buprenorphine/
naltrexone
combination
25 (89) 2 (7) 1 (4) 28
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Prescribing opioid substitution
Most incidents (n = 151) related to prescribing opioid sub-
stitution (Table 3) were due to incomplete or inaccurate
prescriptions (n = 61 of 151, 40%), prescribing the wrong
dose of medication (n = 36 of 151, 24%) or unsafe or con-
traindicated prescribing (n = 12 of 151, 8%). Other inci-
dents identified included prescribing an incorrect number
of doses or specifying an incorrect strength of methadone
liquid.
More than 40% of prescribing incidents involved atten-
tional slips (n = 63 of 151, 42%) (Table 4). Poor communi-
cation between care providers led to 15% of incidents
(n=23 of 151), while 8% involved a failure to follow guide-
lines (n= 12 of 151), such as checkingwhether the patient
was already taking opioids before prescribing methadone.
Six reports described poorly designed prescription forms;
notably, prescribing forms not having space for specifying
formulation of methadone.
Harm was experienced by 9% of patients (n = 14 of
151), with outcomes including missed doses of medica-
tions; repeated visits to or from health-care professionals;
delayed management of their condition; and hospital ad-
mission. Four incidents were prevented from resulting in
harm by a patient’s intervention; for example, noticing
they had been prescribed the wrong dose of medication.
Monitoring and communication of treatment
Incidents relating to monitoring and communication of
treatment were identified in 248 reports, such as failing
to stop dispensing when appropriate (n = 71 of 248,
29%), typically involving not alerting the prescriber after
a client has missed three daily doses to consider
Table 3 Reported processes of care and related incidents by severity of harm.
Process of care
Harm severity, N/n (%)
Total N
(%)No harm Low Moderate
Prescribing opioid substitution 137 (91) 10 (7) 4 (3) 151 (7)
Incomplete/inaccurate prescription 54 7 0 61
Wrong dose 35 0 1 36
Prescription unsafe or contraindicated 9 1 2 12
Incorrect number of doses 7 0 0 7
Incorrect strength of methadone liquid 5 0 0 5
Other 27 2 1 30
Monitoring and communication 226 (91) 19 (8) 3 (1) 248 (11)
Failure to stop dispensing 67 4 0 71
Prescription handling incidents 52 10 0 62
Duplicate prescribing 50 2 2 54
Failures in transfer of patient information 20 0 1 21
Inadequate medical record keeping 17 2 0 19
Other 20 1 0 21
Supervised dispensing 294 (92) 19 (6) 5 (2) 318 (14)
Wrong patient 91 10 3 104
Incorrect dose 69 3 2 74
Failure to supervise consumption 55 1 0 56
Incorrect formulation 35 0 0 35
Incorrect number of doses dispensed 14 3 0 17
Medication redirected 7 0 0 7
Other 23 2 0 25
Non-supervised dispensing 1477 (96) 59 (4) 8 (< 1) 1544 (68)
Incorrect dose 339 22 3 364
Incorrect number of doses 294 7 0 301
Incorrect formulation 287 3 1 291
Wrong patient 203 9 0 212
Dispensed against invalid prescription 177 3 1 181
Incorrect label applied 59 1 1 61
Incorrect medication 50 7 2 59
Other 68 7 0 75
Others 21 (91) 2 (9) 0 23 (1)
Total 2155 109 20 2284
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re-titration as recommended [22]. Other frequent incidents
were due to: prescription handling involving the loss of pre-
scriptions by health-care staff or during transit between
services (n = 62 of 248, 25%); duplicate prescribing
(n = 54 of 248, 22%); failures in transfer of patient infor-
mation between services (n = 21 of 248, 8%); and incor-
rect documentation of quantities of dispensed medication
in pharmacy settings (n = 19 of 248, 8%).
More than one-third (n = 95 of 248, 38%) of incidents
were due, at least in part, to poor continuity of care
between services; for example, after a failure of communi-
cation to halt a patient’s previous prescriptions, resulting
in the patient being able to draw duplicate prescriptions
at separate pharmacies. Poor continuity of care due to poor
information-sharing may also arise if a physician is un-
aware of prescriptions being provided by other services,
allowing hazardous combinations of medications to be pre-
scribed; e.g. simultaneous prescriptions of methadone or
buprenorphine with benzodiazepines. Inadequate proto-
cols or procedures resulted in 13% (32 of 248) of incidents;
Table 4 Most frequent contributing factors with example by process of care.
Contributory factor
Example of contributory
factor
Process of care, N/n (%)
Total, N
Prescribing opioid
substitution
Monitoring and
communication
Supervised
dispensing
Non-supervised
dispensing
Staff factors 92 (6) 103 (7) 201 (14) 1062 (73) 1458
Attentional slips
during execution of a
task
Prescriber misread
previous prescription and
prescribed incorrect dose
76 55 158 840 1129
Failure to follow
protocol
Dispenser did not notify
prescriber of missed doses
12 41 32 172 257
Others 4 7 11 50 72
Organizational factors 77 (8) 167 (17) 145 (14) 621 (61) 1010
Poor working
conditions
Staff were overwhelmed
by work and dispensed
methadone to the wrong
patient
9 11 57 228 305
Poor protocols/
procedures/policies
Pharmacy did not refer
patients who had missed
doses of methadone back
to prescriber
21 32 46 182 281
Poor continuity of
care
General practitioner
unaware of medications
prescribed by other
services
23 95 7 61 186
Locum/agency staff Locum pharmacist
unfamiliar with patients
and hence dispensed to
the incorrect person
5 19 29 126 179
Others 19 10 6 24 59
Patient factors 12 (6) 44 (21) 53 (26) 96 (47) 205
Patient behaviour Patient diverted
methadone to another
client
8 38 40 86 172
Others 4 6 13 10 33
Medication storage/
packaging
Different formulations of
methadone were stored in
similar packaging and
wrong formulation was
dispensed
0 4 (3) 22 (17) 107 (80) 133
Equipment, e.g.
information
technology-related
Methadone dispensing
equipment dispensed the
incorrect volume of
methadone
7 (15) 0 4 (9) 36 (77) 47
Other 8 (3) 9 (3) 36 (12) 246 (82) 299
Total 196 327 461 2168 3152
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for example, pharmacies lacking protocols for storing in-
stalment prescriptions. Patient harm arose in 9% (n = 22
of 248) of incidents, with outcomes including delayed
management, repeated visits to health-care professionals
and hospital admissions.
Supervised dispensing
Incidents during supervised dispensing were described in
318 reports, which included medication being dispensed
to the incorrect patient (n = 104 of 318, 33%), dispensed
at the incorrect dose (n = 74 of 318, 23%) and failures to
supervise consumption of medication despite the prescrip-
tion specifying supervised consumption (n = 56 of 318,
18%). Approximately half of incidents involved
staff-related attentional slips (n = 158 of 318, 50%); these
included the dispenser misreading the prescription. Other
contributory factors identified include poor working
conditions, patient behaviour and inadequate protocols or
double-checking procedures.
In all, 7.5% (n = 24 of 318) of supervised dispensing in-
cidents resulted in harm. These led to organizational incon-
venience, including telephone calls or follow-ups to rectify
or inform the patient or other service about the incident,
repeated visits to health-care providers, repeated tests or
additional treatment and hospital admission. In 18 of
318 (6%) reports, the patient identified that an incident
had occurred and the patient prevented harm.
Non-supervised dispensing
Non-supervised dispensing incidents involved dispensing
incorrect doses of medication (n= 364 of 1544, 24%), sup-
plying an incorrect number of doses (n = 301 of 1544,
19%) or the incorrect formulation of medication
(n = 291 of 1544, 19%). Other incidents involved dispens-
ing medication to the wrong patient (n = 212 of 1544,
14%) and supplying medication against an invalid
prescription (n = 181 off 1544, 12%) for example, it had
expired or was specified to begin at a later date.
Staff errors, notably attentional slips, were implicated in
more than half of incidents (n = 840 of 1544, 54%), often
involving staff becoming distracted or misreading prescrip-
tions. Other staff factors include failing to follow dispensing
protocol; for example, not double-checking dispensed med-
ication against the original prescription or the use of tem-
porary staff being unfamiliar with patients or local
dispensing processes. Environmental and organizational
factors which frequently contributed to incidents included
poor working conditions, inadequate dispensing protocols
and processes and inadequate medication storage or pack-
aging, often involving storing different concentrations of
methadone next to one another contributing to dispensing
the wrong dose. Equipment-related problems involved staff
inputting information incorrectly onto computer-aided
dispensing systems for methadone and buprenorphine or
arising due to lack of machinery calibration.
In all, 4% (n = 67 of 1544) of non-supervised
dispensing incidents resulted in patient harm. Outcomes
for patients included repeated visits to or from a
health-care professional; missed doses of medication; de-
lays in treatment; admission to hospital; and requiring ad-
ditional tests or treatment. Other types of harm included
opioid withdrawal symptoms, such as pain, emotional dis-
tress, drowsiness, nausea and vomiting. Patients identified
64 incidents and prevented harm from occurring.
DISCUSSION
From our analysis of submitted reports, risks of harm in
opioid substitution treatments came from failure in one of
four processes of care delivery: prescribing opioid substitu-
tion; supervised dispensing incidents; non-supervised dis-
pensing incidents; and monitoring and communication
activities.
Medication-related incidents are one of the largest
sources of injury and avoidable harm in health systems
world-wide. Despite being a tightly regulated service to pre-
vent drugmisuse [22], little is known about the occurrence
of medication-related incidents within opioid substitution
services. Even if a patient safety incident occurs in only a
small proportion of cases, the challenges associated with
the increasing prevalence of opioid dependence facing
many nations [5–7] will multiply greatly the number of
people needing and using such substitution therapies. As
a result, many more people will be at risk of, and many
more will be exposed to, the potentially harmful effects of
medication-related incidents. Add to this the additional
work-load pressures on already overstretched services
[12,23], and another well-established incident-prone situ-
ation is created.
We believe that our study is the first to use patient
safety data to explore sources of incidents and potential
harm from opioid substitution therapies in community set-
tings. We found that patient safety incidents involving
methadone were nearly four times more commonly
reported than those associated with buprenorphine. Com-
pared to methadone, buprenorphine is consistently associ-
ated in the United Kingdom with lower rates of mortality,
and prescribing data demonstrate that its popularity has
increased from use in fewer than 20% of treatment
episodes between 1998 and 2000 (83% methadone) to
41% between 2010 and 2014 (59% methadone) [24].
Understanding the reasons for unsafe care involving
methadone and buprenorphine is essential to mitigating
risk and strengthening systems to prevent future harm to
this already vulnerable group of health-care users. Encour-
agingly, for the prospect of targeted prevention, we found
that most incidents fell within one of only four processes
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of care: prescribing, dispensing (whether supervised or un-
supervised) and when undertaking monitoring and com-
munication activities. Potential evidence-based
interventions to address the failures in each of the four
incident-prone processes of care exist.
Treatment decision-making and prescribing of metha-
done and buprenorphine for opioid addiction is complex
and varies due to a diversity of patient factors, variability
among clinicians (e.g. experience, speciality) and location
of delivery (primary care, pharmacy, criminal justice
settings) and the legal and regulatory position in the
jurisdiction concerned [25,26]. Our data show that when
incidents involving prescribing occurred, these had the
highest proportion resulting in patient harm (14 of 151,
9%) and warrant targeted interventions to improve the
safe provision of opioid substitution.
First, provider education could bolster compliance with
legal requirements for prescribing opioids and reinforce
protocols to reduce variability in prescribing—the
American Hospital Association toolkit is a good framework
to guide this process [27]; and secondly, the development of
support for prescribers, such as electronic prescribing
systems with inbuilt safety prompts to highlight patients
at risk of overdose. Thirdly, the co-prescription of benzodiaz-
epines is one that could raise a red flag to prescribers to
promote safer prescribing. Fourthly, greater deployment
of clinical decision support tools could promote adherence
to prescribing guidelines [28–30], with safety prompts
innovatively designed to mitigate the effects of ‘alert
fatigue’ [31].
Action cannot rest with measures to ensure safer pre-
scribing practice. Dispensing is also an important source
of risk. Incidents involving non-supervised dispensing and
supervised dispensing were the most frequently reported,
but had the lowest proportion resulting in harm in our
study. Nonetheless, due to the large number of reports,
these constituted the majority of incidents resulting in
harm (n = 91 of 127, 72%), and attention should also be
focused on mitigating against the risk of dispensing
incidents.
We found that dispensers of opioid substitution therapy
often failed to contact the prescriber to obtain advice on
whether to continue the supply despite three missed daily
doses of methadone. Further, protocols and procedures
for monitoring and communicating information about
methadone use were inadequate. Poor information-
sharing between different care providers during transitions
of care led to duplicate prescribing. Centralized electronic
recording systems could allow for safe prescribing, dispens-
ing and monitoring of opioid substitution treatment, stop
duplicate prescriptions and improve information-sharing
between care providers through electronic transmission
of prescriptions [32]. The existing evidence suggests that
interventions could ensure careful induction (including
detailed assessment of opioid tolerance), rigorous monitor-
ing and full stabilization during the first month of
treatment due to higher mortality [33–35].
Where medication was dispensed to the wrong person
during supervised or non-supervised dispensing, poor
working conditions and patient behaviour (including
redirecting medication to another person) were contribu-
tory factors. Safeguarding against diversion of prescribed
opioids is vital for the development of safe opioid substitu-
tion treatment programmes [27]. Developing systems to
incorporate rigorous identity checks, double-checking
dispensed medication and introducing biometrics such as
fingerprints or card reading are all possible strategies
[36]. Medical-assisted therapy combines pharmacological
treatment of opioid addiction with support services, such
as psychosocial counselling, treatment for comorbid disor-
ders and vocational rehabilitation to aid recovery [37].
Behaviour therapy appears to give better retention rates,
but the evidence is not definitive because of a lack of
long-term follow-up [38]. We have pointed to the role of
the patient in identifying and preventing incidents. Existing
evidence suggests that involving patients in decisions about
treatment plans and educating them about risk of overdose
(including the use of naloxone) could enhance patient–
provider partnership working and compliance [2,27].
It is little surprise that we found incidents relating to the
wrong formulation, dose or number of doses in the dispens-
ing of methadone or buprenorphine, as these are promi-
nent sources of medication-related harm in other fields of
health care [39]. Complex incident reduction interventions
using feedback and training could be effective in commu-
nity pharmacies and could be adapted for dispensingmeth-
adone and buprenorphine [40]. For example, stocking
multiple concentrations of methadone is a serious source
of risk and could be eliminated [41]. Dispensing machines
should be regularly calibrated and staff trained in their
use to prevent this source of dispensing incidents. We have
summarized our recommendations in the form of a driver
diagram (Fig. 2).
Limitations
All incident reporting data, whether in health care or other
high-risk industries, have the limitation of under-reporting
of incidents as well as potential reporting bias [42]. They
should therefore not be used to make estimates of inci-
dence, nor to make geographical or institutional compari-
sons, in case variable reporting rates lead to spurious
conclusions. These types of analysis of the patient safety
incident data were not part of our study. When data are
aggregated to national level, as we have done, bearing in
mind these limitations, they can provide important insights
into systemic factors underlying harm. As perceived con-
tributory factors actions to prevent recurrence were not
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mandatory fields, information in these fields was not con-
sistently available, potentially limiting our findings. While
our study team is not representative of all health-care pro-
fessionals working within community settings, we were
able to draw upon the expertise of different professional
groups when required.
We were rigorous in minimizing the risk of observer
bias. We double-coded 20% of incidents to ensure consis-
tency of coding.We held regular codingmeetings to discuss
discrepancies. We maintained a clear audit trail recording
coding decisions. Although none of the incident reports
in our study population involved severe harm or death,
many had the potential to bemore severe or fatal. It is likely
that people who had experienced severe adverse outcomes
from opioid substitution therapy are more likely to present
to emergency departments, and so incident reports from
community-based clinics may not identify them. In the
United Kingdom, some addiction services can be provided
through third-sector services, such as charities, and these
may be under-represented in our study. Further research
using retrospective case reviews of patients’ notes who
have been involved in a patient safety incident could pro-
vide additional complementary insights and more detail
into the prevalence, nature and severity of methadone-
and buprenorphine-related harm.
CONCLUSION
Addiction to opioids is a chronic disease, and sustainable
strategies are needed to enable citizens to access
high-value services and medications that ensure optimal
health and wellbeing. Our study of patient safety incidents
involving opioid substitution treatment with methadone or
buprenorphine in community-based settings in England
and Wales highlights risks from the delivery of services,
and we highlight caution around prescribing practices, ef-
fective communication mechanisms for providers working
across services and safe dispensing of potentially lethal
medicines.
Priority areas for health-care systems world-wide to
strengthen processes to mitigate against unsafe opioid
substitution may include prescriber education,
implementing and strengthening electronic prescribing
systems to include transfer of prescriptions between pre-
scriber and pharmacy, dispensing and monitoring systems,
as well as specific procedural and educational interventions
for pharmacy staff.
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